Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 4.djvu/34

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 32 1154 VIETNAM ARMY STRENGTH WAS 170,000. IT WAS POORLY TRAINED AND ORGANIZED AND HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON FRENCH FOR STAFF, LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND ADVICE. /JCS HIST.

1154 THE FRENCH ASKED THE U.S. TO SUPPORT A 100,000 MAN FEC AT A COST OF $530 MILLION. /JCS HIST.

1154 SMM SURVEY OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY REPORTED GOOD TROOP–CIVILIAN RAPPORT.

110854 COLLINS ARRIVED IN SAIGON AS PRES. EISENHOWER'S REPRESENTATIVE.

110854 HEATH AND COLLINS FELT SOME SUPPORT TO FEC ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT A VACUUM THAT VNA COULD NOT FILL WHICH WOULD RESULT IN VIETMINH TAKEOVER. FEC PRESENCE ESSENTIAL TO U.S. PROGRAM. /JCS HIST.

111654 COLLINS ISSUED HIS COMPROMISE BETWEEN DEPT. OF STATE AND JCS' PLAN ON STRENGTH OF VNA. IT CALLED FOR A 77,685 MAN ARMY WITH 4,000 CIVILIANS AND A SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVY. /JCS HIST.

111754 THE JCS APPROVED COLLINS' PLAN BUT REITERATED THAT HIS FORCE COULD NOT PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK. /JCS HIST.

111754 IN A MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT, DULLES REITERATED GENERAL COLLINS' VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR FEC TO WITHDRAW. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUBSIDIZE UP TO $100 MILLION. THE VNA SHOULD BE REDUCED TO 77,000 AND TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED BY THE U.S. /JCS HIST.

111954 HINH LEFT SAIGON FOR FRANCE AT THE REQUEST OF BAO DAI. /JCS HIST.

112054 MENDES-FRANCE VISITED WASHINGTON AFTER WHICH THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE SEPTEMBER WASHINGTON CONFERENCE WERE MADE PUBLIC. /J.B.DRAGON.

112354 NIE 63–7-54 REPORTED A DEMORALIZED, DISORGANIZED VNA. LEADERSHIP AND CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL DISORDERS WERE BOTH LACKING. THE VIETNAMESE GENERAL STAFF, BUSY WITH POLITICS, NEGLECTED THE ARMY WITH THE RESULT THAT THE ARMY WAS INCAPABLE OF OCCUPYING AND PACIFYING AREAS FROM WHICH THE VIETMINH HAD WITHDRAWN. TRAINING OF THE VNA WAS BEING PERFORMED BY 4,800 FRENCH OFFICERS OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION TO VIETNAM. THIS MISSION WAS TO BE INCREASED TO 6,000 BY THE END OF 19

VIETNAMESE ARMY STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 170,000 REGULARS AND 10,000 AUXILIARIES. REGULARS WERE ORGANIZED IN 5 INFANTRY REGIMENTS, 152 COMBAT BATTALIONS. 20 PERCENT OF THE INFANTRY UNITS HAD FRENCH OFFICERS AND 50 PERCENT OF LOGISTICS AND TECHNICAL UNITS WERE CADRES OF FRENCH PERSONNEL. THE VNA WAS DEPICTED AS TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE AS A RESULT OF ITS DEPENDENCY ON THE FRENCH FOR ALL ADVICE AND SUPPORT.

THE DIEM GOVERNMENT PROPOSED A 200,000 MAN ARMY BY THE END OF 1954 TO BE INCREASED TO 225,000 BY THE END OF 1955. COST—$450 MILLION. V