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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 31 101554 SENATOR MANSFIELD ISSUED A REPORT ON INDOCHINA. IT SPOKE OUT SHARPLY AGAINST PLANS TO REPLACE DIEM. IF DIEM WAS OVERTHROWN THEN THE U.S. SHOULD CONSIDER AN IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF ALL AID TO VIETNAM AND THE FRENCH UNION FORCES THERE, EXCEPT THAT OF A HUMANITARIAN NATURE. MANSFIELD DEFENDED DIEM ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAD A REPUTATION THROUGHOUT VIETNAM FOR INTENSE NATIONALISM AND EQUALLY INTENSE INCORRUPTIBILITY HE DENOUNCED THE INCREDIBLE CAMPAIGN OF SUBVERSION BY INTRIGUE AND THE CONSPIRACY OF NON-COOPERATION AND SABOTAGE THAT HAD STOOD IN THE WAY OF DIEM'S FORGING AHEAD WITH HIS PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM. /U.S.

101554 THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING MINOR POLICE ACTIONS WITHOUT FRENCH STAFF AND LOGISTICS. /JCS HIST.

101854 JCS VIEWED THE POLITICAL NECESSITY OF TRAINING THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS WORTH THE RISK. /JCS HIST.

101954 IN MEMO TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JCS ELABORATED ON THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INCREASED VIETNAMESE ARMY. SEATO DID NOT PROVIDE FOR MILITARY COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL OF FEC WOULD CREATE A SERIOUS VACUUM TO COPE WITH RESIDUAL VIETMINH AGGRESSION. VIETNAM OBJECTIVE WAS THE LIMITED DEFENSE OF THE 17TH PARALLEL TO DETER AGGRESSION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY. JCS DID NOT WANT TO TRAIN SOUTH VIETNAMESE WITH ONLY A 342–MAN MAAG. BUT IF TRAINING WAS NECESSARY, THEY FELT THAT FRANCE "HANDS OFF" WAS ESSENTIAL. /JCS HIST.

102254 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVED THE OPERATIONS CO-ORDINATING BOARD CALLING FOR A LIMITED AND INTERIM TRAINING PROGRAM. A MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR HEATH IN SAIGON AND GENERAL O'DANIEL INSTRUCTED THEM TO COLLABORATE IN ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM THAT WOULD IMPROVE THE LOYALTY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VNA. THIS SURPRISED THE FRENCH. /JCS HIST.

102254 PRES. EISENHOWER ORDERED A CRASH PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN THE DIEM GOVERNMENT AND A LONG RANGE PROGRAM TO BUILD UP VIETNAMESE FORCES.

102254 PRES. EISENHOWER SENT A LETTER TO PREMIER DIEM OF SOUTH VIETNAM STATING THAT BEGINNING JAN. 1, 1955, AMERICAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN NO LONGER THROUGH FRENCH AUTHORITIES, BUT DIRECTLY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE LETTER ALSO STATED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HOPED THEY WOULD BE MET BY UNDERTAKING INDISPENSIBLE REFORMS.

102654 GENERAL HINH ATTACKED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

102654 IN A MEMO FROM SEC.DEF. TO JCS THE VIEWS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WERE EXPRESSED RE VIETNAMESE ARMY TRAINING. IT SHOULD BE A LONG RANGE PROGRAM INVOLVING A MINIMUM NUMBER OF FREE VIETNAMESE FORCES, EMPHASIZING THE INTERNAL SECURITY MISSION. /JCS HIST.

102754 AMERICAN MILITARY INFLUENCE IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY BEGAN WITH THE PLACEMENT OF 3 MAAG OFFICERS AT VIETNAMESE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1 IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND 1 AT EACH REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS. THE DECISION WAS MADE BY AMBASSADOR HEATH, AND GEN. L'DANIEL WITH GEN. ELY'S APPROVAL. /JCS HIST. U