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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 24 041654 VICE PRESIDENT NIXON IN AN ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS RULED OUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS TO DIVIDE THE TERRITORY. HE SAID, "IT IS HOPED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT HAVE TO SEND TROOPS THERE, BUT IF THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AVOID IT, THE ADMINISTRATION MUST FACE UP TO THE SITUATION AND DISPATCH FORCES." /GETTLEMEN

042654 PUBLIC REACTION WAS SO ADVERSE TO NIXON'S STATEMENT THAT DULLES SAID THAT THE SENDING OF TROOPS WAS UNLIKELY. /FLEM-CWO.

042854 A JOINT FRANCO–VIETNAMESE DECLARATION STATED THAT VIETNAM, (THE INDEPENDENCE OF WHICH THE FRENCH HAD PROCLAIMED HALF A DOZEN TIMES), WAS FULLY INDEPENDENT.

0554 THE QUAI D'ORSAY AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF STATE SENT ITS EMISSARIES TO BAO DAI AT CANNES TO RIG THE APPOINTMENT OF DIEM ARRIVED IN SAIGON 1954. (WID 41-57) EARLY IN MAY DIEM HAD TROUBLE WITH BAO DAI. NEITHER FRENCH NOR BAO DAI HAD ANY LIKING FOR DIEM. DULLES AND CARDINAL SPELLMAN WERE IN FAVOR OF A GOVERNMENT HEADED BY DIEM ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT DULLES WAS NOT OVERENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT DIEM. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT OPPOSE IT. SOME FRENCH LEADERS ENCOURAGED IT — FORMER HIGH COMMISSIONER LETOURNEAU AND FREDERIC-DUPONT, WHO FOR A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE FALL OF THE LANIEL HAD SERVED AS MINISTER FOR THE ASSOCIATED STATES OF INDOCHINA. /J.B.

050354 MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS J.H. TRAFNELL DISAGREED IN NEARLY ALL RESPECTS WITH GENERAL O'DANIEL ON ASSESSMENT OF THE INDOCHINA WAR. HE STRESSED THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE WAR AND SAID THAT A STRICTLY MILITARY SOLUTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE.

050654 DIEN BIEN PHU FELL.

050754 AFTER DIEN BIEN PHU FELL, SECRETARY DULLES SAID THAT THE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN INDOCHINA DID NOT PROVIDE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR THE U.S. TO PARTICIPATE WITH ITS ARMED FORCES. HE DECLARED HOWEVER, THAT IF AN ARMISTICE OR CEASEFIRE CONCLUDED AT GENEVA PROVIDED A ROAD TO A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND FURTHER AGGRESSION, OR IF HOSTILITIES CONTINUED, THEN THE NEED WOULD BE EVEN MORE URGENT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR UNITED ACTION IN DEFENSE OF THE AREA. THE SECRETARY THEN POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. WOULD NOT TAKE MILITARY ACTION IN INDOCHINA WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF CONGRESS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT SEEK SUCH SUPPORT UNLESS THERE WAS ADEQUATE COLLECTIVE EFFORT BASED ON GENUINE MUTUALITY OF PURPOSE IN DEFENDING VITAL INTERESTS.

050854 GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA. (MAY 8 – JULY 21)

051254 REPORTS OF A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON AT WHICH DULLES WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DECLARED THAT THE RETENTION OF INDOCHINA WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AFFECTED FRENCH MORALE ADVERSELY AT GENEVA. N