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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 8  : generated in Saigon, Diem carrying his position to the highest levels of the agency of his choice, while U.S. representatives had to seek protagonists at various levels within their own agencies. The implications for U.S. policy in the field are obvious.

Because of the divisions and diversions inherent in the above, U.S. aid in the period up to 1960 failed to produce an effective counterinsurgent force either within the National Army, or in the paramilitary organizations. This is not to imply that had resources been diverted from the creation of a conventional array to that of an effective counterinsurgent force the problem of Vietnam would have been solved, for the enemy has demonstrated both versatility and flexibility that would render such a statement vacuous. It is to suggest, however, that given the world situation in the period of relevance and the situation in Southeast Asia, it seems likely that the DRV, whatever strategic alternative it might have elected to follow, would not have been deterred from overt aggression by any army of Vietnam it was within U.S.–GVN capability to create. An effective counterinsurgent force, on the other hand, might have limited its choices; might well have prevented effective prosecution of the guerrilla alternative the Viet Cong and the DRV did elect to follow. Rh