Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 3.djvu/68

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  {|
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 * Deptel 610 to Paris, 18 Aug 54 (S).
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 * NSC 5429/2, 20 Aug 54 (TS). JCS arguments against dealing with the DRV are contained in the NSC Records of Meetings 210 and 211 (8 and 12 Aug 54). Saigon Msgs 336, 27 Jul 54 (S), 518, 10 Aug 54. (Ambassador Heath also argued against dealing with Hanoi because it would lead the South Vietnamese to think the US planned accommodation with the communists).
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 * Paris Msg 2080, 15 Nov 54 (S)
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 * NIE 63-5-54
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 * State Department Report, "A U.S. Policy for Post–Armistice Indochina", 12 Aug 54 (S).
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 * Paris Msg 481, 4 Aug 54 (S)
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 * Deptel 1023 to Saigon, 14 Sep 54 (S). State Department Report, "A U.S. Policy for Post–Armistice Indochina"; 12 Aug 54. State Department Report, "Other Major Political Questions", 27 Aug 54. President Eisenhower states: "On August 11, I directed that aid to Indochina henceforth be given directly to the Associated states rather than France", in (Doubleday, 1963), p. 361.
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 * NSC 5429/2
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 * NIE 63-5-54
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 * Memorandum for Record, Meeting of General Valluy and Admiral Radford 3 Jun 54 (TS). Chief MAAG IC Msg 2062A to Department of the Army, 271130ZJul54 (S).
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 * JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina", 4 Aug 54 (TS)
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 * Letter, Secretary of State Dulles to Secretary of Defense Wilson, 18 Aug 54 (TS)
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 * JCS Memorandum for the SecDef, Subject: "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina", 22 Sep 54 (TS). State feared France and Britain would object to the JCS conditions and were loath to disclose them; Cambodia seemed unwilling to antagonize France by accepting them. JCS insistence was firm, however, and the establishment of a MAAG in Cambodia was stalled for several months until views finally prevailed. The matter of a unilateral agreement itself was at least an indirect affront to France because the US apparently agreed to French demands for a joint training venture in Cambodia
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