Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 3.djvu/13

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  {| style="width:100%; text-align:left" cellspacing="10"
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 * width="50%"| withdraw from French Union) to South Vietnam and support a strong indigenous government. Diem must broaden the governmental base, elect an assembly, draft a constitution and legally dethrone Bao Dai. French support and cooperation for these policies was necessary; retention of the FEC was essential to South Vietnamese security.
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 * Aug 54
 * Sainteny Mission
 * Jean Sainteny was sent to Hanoi to find ways to protect French economic and cultural interstsinterests [sic] in the DRV. Political overtones of the mission annoyed the US and General Paul Ely, High Commissioner in the South. Ely received firm assurance from Mendes-France that France was not playing a "double game", has not sent Sainteny for political bridge-building purposes. Mendes-France reaffirmed French support for an independent, strong South Vietnam.
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 * 8 Sep 54
 * Manila Pact Signed
 * Dulles' anti-communist military alliance was realized in SEATO. The Associated States of Indochina were covered by separate protocol ensuring collective defense by SEATO nations in case of subversion or aggression.
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 * 27–29 Sep 54
 * Washington Conference
 * France agreed to support Diem (against the French belief that Diem would prove unable to unify or stabilize the country); agreed to keep the FEC in South Vietnam but received no indication of possible US financial aid for the French forces. France knew economic and military aid would be given directly to Vietnam but was led to believe she would have a hand in its distribution by ambiguous US-drafted statements. The US military role in Vietnam was
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