Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 2.djvu/35

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  {| |} Rh
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 * Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Possible Future Action in Indochina, October 27, 1950 (TS).
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 * Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, December 21, 1950 (TS).
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 * Department of State Incoming Message from U.S. Minister Saigon 763, November 4, 1950 (TS).
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 * NSC Staff Study on Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, December 28, 1950 (TS).
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 * Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State to the National Security Council on the Implementation of NSC 64, March 15, 1951 (IS).
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 * OCMH TS-64-7-1, pp. 36, 47–48. All numbers are taken to be approximations.
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 * Irving Heymont, .,, RAC-TP-232, June 1967, Vol 1, p. 10 (S).
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 * ., informal memorandum from Mr. Max Lehrer to General Bonesteel of April 21, 1954: "This [attached] report makes it clear that the U.S. MAAG has little information available on which it could operate. The written report actually understates the deficiencies in information. Our people find that the morale of the MAAG in Indochina is virtually non-existent and the MAAG is reduced to relative impotence."
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 * Department of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837, February 22, 1950 (S).
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 * NIE 63–54,, April 30, 1954 (S).
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 * Regarding the Letourneau-Allard plan, General Trapnell, Chief MAAG, reported, "while this plan is slow and expensive, the other course of action is to accept a stalemate which is also not only expensive, but in the long run, favors the Viet Minh and offers no solution." (Memorandum from General Trapnell, OSD files, March 31, 1953)
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 * Although General O'Daniel, in his report of July 15, 1953 (TS) waxed enthusiastic over the successor Navarre Plan, broadly and attractively described to him by General Navarre himself, it was clear to others that the plan was hollow. "There is no concrete evidence that the French Union forces will be able to take decisive action to win the war in the foreseeable future..." (Comments by Army Attache, Saigon, November 24, 1953 (S))