Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 2.djvu/18

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive :::(2)  - French between 1.5 and 1.6 to 1 Viet Minh; vis-a-vis regular forces in the Tonkin Delta, the ratio was reversed - approximately 1.15 Viet Minh to 1 French (NIE 5).


 * (3) - French superiority, but Viet Minh improving due to Chinese aid.


 * (4) - Viet Minh superior; French roadbound.


 * (5) - French strategy lacking in aggressiveness, defensive, of doubtful value.


 * (6) - essentially none; "only a slight chance that the French can maintain their military position long enough" to build such an army.


 * (7) - danger of a major military defeat of the French by the Viet Minh in Tonkin within six to nine months, which would jeopardize the French position in the remainder of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.


 * b.

French resources badly strained; little or no real nationalist Vietnamese leadership, government; little popular support of Bao Dai regime; political and economic situation generally poor.


 * c.

French slowness and obstructionism over the years in creating a Vietnamese national government and national army (March 8, 1949, agreements were not ratified by France until February 2, 1950), and continued slowness in giving control of the bureaucracy to the Vietnamese, indicate a reluctant departure, if any departure, from colonial objectives.


 * d.

"... there are grounds for questioning the French will to remain in Indochina."

Thus, the American perception of the situation in Vietnam in 1950 was generally one of gloom, with little light at the end of the tunnel; in retrospect, it seems reasonably accurate.


 * 6.


 * a.

United States involvement in the bleak Indochinese situation was hastened when, on February 16, 1950, the French requested U.S. military Rh