Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 1.djvu/36

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive :::(3) Thailand Planning

In May 1962 when the Pathet Lao threat against Thailand became acute, a U.S. battle group was dispatched on joint training exercises within the country. President Kennedy announced that more U.S. troops would be sent, and by 15 May a second contingent landed. On the same day, newspapers reported that the U.S. was seeking SEATO help, and that W. Averell Harriman, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, had "outlined the U.S. position in separate conferences with envoys of Australia, New ZelandZealand [sic], Pakistan, and the Philippines." Within two days, all the SEATO members except France had agreed to send help if necessary. The U.S. sent 4,000 troops into Thailand. Three other SEATO nations actually put forces (albeit token forces) into Thailand. The UK sent 10 Hunter jet fighters, Australia sent a jet squadron, and New Zealand sent 100 parachute troops and three transport aircraft. The Philippines and Pakistan publicly noted that they were standing by to help.


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Discussions on the best method under SEATO to "meet the common danger" in Vietnam have not produced an overall agreement, and three of the eight SEATO nations — the UK, France, and Pakistan — have not responded to Vietnam's invitation to commit troops there. Of the five SEATO nations now fighting in Vietnam, the strength figures as of 17 October 1967 were:

One non-member of SEATO, the Republic of Korea, was contributing 18,000 troops to the fighting as of that date, raising the Free World Forces total to 528,400. France, in view of past policies, could not be expected to make a contribution; the amount of SEATO "unity" displayed by French participation would be offset by other obvious considerations. Pakistani assistance might be welcomed as a gesture of support for SEATO. But the major shortfall to date in SEATO has been the British decision that it is unable to participate militarily in Vietnam.

With all its weaknesses, the majority of the SEATO pact nations have actually collaborated in regional defense in the Vietnam war. In fact, given the range of disparity among the members, it is a source of wonder that support of SEATO nations for Vietnam has been as strong as it has been. The conflict In Vietnam is a crucible for SEATO; the future of the alliance will be profoundly affected by the outcome of the war. Rh