Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part III.djvu/71

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  {|
 * -valign="top"
 * U.S. VerbMin/3, pp. 104, 105.
 * -valign="top"
 * I.C. Restricted/5, p. 16 (C). Records of the Restricted Sessions are summaries rather than word-for-word quotations, for the most part.
 * -valign="top"
 * I.C. Restricted/6, p. 16 (C).
 * -valign="top"
 * I.C. Restricted/7, p.13 (C).
 * -valign="top"
 * U.S. VerbMin/7, p. 344.
 * -valign="top"
 * I.C. Restricted/14, p. 26 (C).
 * -valign="top"
 * CIA Report CS-42198, July 14, 1954, from Saigon (SECRET). Lacouture and. Devillers hold that Diem was stupefied when he learned of partition for the first time from Ambassador Heath via a personal letter from Eisenhower, July 12 (pp. 256–57).
 * -valign="top"
 * Reported in Smith's priority tel. SECTO 633 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
 * -valign="top"
 * McClintock from Saigon tel. No. 2656, June 4, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
 * -valign="top"
 * Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 633, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
 * -valign="top"
 * Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 654, July 18, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL); Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 655, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).
 * -valign="top"
 * Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 673, July 19, 1954 (SECRET).
 * -valign="top"
 * U.S. VerbMin/8, pp. 347–48.
 * -valign="top"
 * ., p. 355.
 * -valign="top"
 * Hans Morgenthau, "The 1954 Geneva Conference: An Assessment," in, New York: American Friends of Vietnam, 1956, pp. 64–70.
 * -valign="top"
 * Dulles to Smith at Geneva priority tel. TEDUC 212, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
 * -valign="top"
 * Smith from Geneva priority DULTE 195; June 18, 1954 (SECRET). In an aide-memoire delivered by Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador to Washington, to Dulles and Eden on June 26, the French government urged the U.S. not to encourage an adverse Vietnamese reaction to partition. The U.S. was also asked "to intervene with the Vietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but on the contrary by the desire to save in Indochina all that can possibly be saved, and to give the Vietnamese
 * } Rh