Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part III.djvu/35

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  {|
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 * Dillon priority telegram from Paris No. 4596, May 29, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Smith from Geneva SECTO 331, May 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET) and Dillon from Paris (reporting talks with Schumann) No. 4580, May 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * McClintock from Saigon No. 2468 to Dulles, May 19, 1954 (SECRET); Dillon from Paris "eyes only" for Dulles, Smith, and McClintock No. 4566, May 27, 1954 (TOP SECRET), reporting Trapnell–Ely talks. Ely and O'Daniel were still at odds, Dillon noted, over structural changes in the NVA, war strategy, and the role of U.S. advisors.
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 * .; also, Dillon priority telegram from Paris No. 4612, May 31, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * Murphy (acting Secretary) to American Embassy – Paris NIACT 4325, May 29, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * Dillon from Paris No. 4607, May 30, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Dillon from Paris No. 4625, June 1, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * Murphy to American Embassy – Paris NIACT 4332, May 31, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * Eisenhower's unwavering attitude toward action in Asia only in concert with allies put him at odds with Dulles, who was prepared to act unilaterally at least in circumstances of overt aggression. When the issue of possible CPR air intervention came before the President, he is reported to have reacted sharply. Evidently supposing that conflict in the air would mean a Sino–U.S. war, the President said the United States would not intervene in China on any basis except united action. He would not be responsible for going into China alone unless a joint Congressional resolution ordered him to do so. The United States should in no event undertake alone to support French colonialism. Unilateral action by the United States in cases of this kind would destroy us. If we intervened alone in this case, we would be expected to intervene alone in other parts of the world. He made very plain that the need for united action as a condition of U.S. intervention was not related merely to the regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia but was also a necessity for U.S. intervention in response to Chinese Communist overt aggression.

Yet, when reminded by his Special Assistant, Robert Cutler, of NSC 5405's position that U.S. unilateral action could not be ruled out in the event of overt Chinese aggression against Thailand, Burma, or Malaya, and of Dulles' September 2, 1953 warning to China of a direct U.S. response to Chinese aggression in Indochina, the President stated that no difference existed between himself and. Dulles. (Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Cutler, June 1, 1954, TOP SECRET).
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