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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  {|
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 * OCB,, Tab E, "Plan for Political Warfare in Regard to Communist China intervention in Indochina," undated, in enclosure to memorandum from E. F. Drumright to Robert Murphy, May 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * This conceptualization stemmed from discussions of the NSC Planning Board, and was part of a broader contingency study program. See the Board's statement in an enclosure to a memorandum for Robert Bowie (the Board's chairman), May 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * Memorandum from JCS to the Secretary of Defense, May 20, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * These conclusions were confirmed when, at the direction of General Ridgway, a technical team of seven officers representing the Engineer, Transportation, and Signal Corps went to Indochina on a covert mission to determine military and  military-related resources available there in the event U.S. intervention was implemented. The team spent the period May 31–June 22 in the field. Their conclusions were, in general, that Indochina was devoid of the logistical, geographic, and related resources necessary to a substantial American ground effort such as Ridgway felt would be required for a success. The group's findings are in a report from Col. David W. Heiman, its leader, to Ridgway, July 12, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL).

The Chiefs' conclusions were disputed, however, by Drumright (in a memorandum to MacArthur, May 24, 1954, TOP SECRET). He argued that if, as everyone agreed, Indochina was vital to American security, the U.S. should not consider more than a token ground troop commitment to be a serious diversion of our capabilities. While not arguing a substantial troop commitment, Drumright suggested that the U.S.  for  eventuality rather than count on defense with atomic weapons or non-nuclear strikes on Chinese territory. Somehow, however, Drumright's concern about the Chinese did not extend to the consideration that a massive U.S. troop commitment, which he stated elsewhere in the memorandum prove necessary should token forces fail to do the job, risked bringing on the Chinese.
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 * Smith from Geneva "eyes only" tel. DULTE 100 to Dulles, May 23, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * Dulles to Smith at Geneva tel. TEDUL 116, May 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
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 * On April 28 French and Vietnamese representatives in Paris initialled separate treaties of independence and association. The treaties did not take effect, however, until June 4, when the French National Assembly finally approved the documents.
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 * Dulles tel. to American Embassy – Paris No. 4272, May 26, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Lacouture and Devillers, p. 192.
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