Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part II.djvu/73

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive ::h.

The principal result of the discussions on the NSC 177 Special Annex was to bring into the open the issue of the costs in manpower and materiel of a U.S. involvement. The Army was critical of contingency planning that was based on the assumption that U.S. air and naval force could be used in Indochina without the commitment of ground combat forces. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, later wrote in his that he was quite disturbed at talk in high government circles about employing air–naval power alone in Indochina. An Army position paper submitted to the NSC in the first week of April, 1954, argued as follows:


 * "1. U.S. intervention with combat forces in Indochina is not militarily desirable...


 * "2. A victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. intervention with air and naval forces alone.


 * "3. The use of atomic weapons in Indochina would not reduce the number of ground forces required to achieve a victory in Indochina.


 * "4. Seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists do not intervene. However, U.S. intervention plans cannot be based on the assumption that the Chinese Communists will not intervene.


 * "5. The equivalent of 12 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina, if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists intervene.


 * "6. The equiyalent of 7 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French remain and the Chinese Communists intervene.


 * "7. Requirements for air and naval support for ground force operations are:


 * a. Five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive of interdiction and counter-air operations.


 * b. An airlift capability of a one division drop.


 * c. A division amphibious lift.

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