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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive  : long disorder could produce worthwhile result end whether he considers compromise on status Cochinchina would possibly be reached through negotiation.


 * "May say American people have welcomed attainments Indochinese in efforts realize praiseworthy aspirations greater autonomy in framework democratic institutions and it would be regrettable should this interest and sympathy be imperilled by any tendency Vietnam administration force issues by intransigence and violence.


 * "May inform Ho [U.S. Ambassador, Paris] discussing situation French similar frankness....


 * "Avoid impression US Govt making formal intervention this juncture. Publicity any kind would be unfortunate."

In response to Under Secretary Acheson's telegram, the following was reported to Washington on December 17, 1946 — just before the outbreak of hostilities in Hanoi:


 * "After conversations with French and Vietnamese officials and British, Chinese and US Consuls Hanoi Mr. Abbot Moffat, who is at present in SEA, has developed views in which Consul Saigon occurs along the following lines:


 * "The Vietnam Government is in control of a small Communist group possibly in indirect touch with Moscow and direct touch with Yenan. A nationalist group is utilizing Communist party techniques and discipline with which they are familiar. The people are conservative landowners and attempts to communize the country are secondary and would await successful operation of a nationalist state. Apparently some leaders, like Ho Chi Minh, consider collaboration with the French essential; those like Giap (Vo Nguyen Giap, Minister of National Defense) would avoid collaboration fearing French domination but might not reject French influence and aid. Nationalist sentiment runs deep among the Vietnamese and does opposition to the French, and they might easily turn against all whites. French influence is important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence but to protect Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism. Delay in achieving a settlement will progressively diminish the possibility of ultimate French influence. Rh