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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 the terrain along the Laos-G.V.N. boundary makes it almost impossible to establish a "water-tight" border. However, this same rugged terrain limits the smuggling routes to one principal road, (the east-west highway from Savannahhet to Tchopone to Quang Tri) and to some 12–15 reasonably passable trails. With the reinforcement of the G.V.N. Army in the Konium plateau region; with the establishment of a thoroughly effective intelligence and patrol system using the most modern communications equipment; with regular ae rial surveillance of the entire border region; and with the application of new technological area-denial techniques (e.g., GW, BW, ligh plastic, air-droppable landmines, fluorescent materials, etc.); it should be possible to hold the flow of Communist agents and supplies to the current levels. As these measures are applied the efficiency of the border patrol system can be expected to increase and it is not unreasonable to expect that the flow of Communist aid to the Viet Cong might even be reduced somewhat.

The third, however, poses a direct and serious military threat to the entire western flank of South Vietnam. It cannot be met within the dimensions of our internal security program alone. It requires the prompt organization of two new G.V.N. divisions and a vastly accelerated U.S. training program for the entire G.V.N. army. This cannot be conceived of in terms of regular MAAG training, as its success depends upon raising the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces by an entire order Rh