Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/52

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  {|
 * In local piastres (for Defense Support, etc.) || 156 || 160
 * In U.S. Currency (for technical services, etc.) || 3.8 || 3.8
 * MAP || 73.9 || 65.
 * || 233.7 || 227.8
 * }
 * In U.S. Currency (for technical services, etc.) || 3.8 || 3.8
 * MAP || 73.9 || 65.
 * || 233.7 || 227.8
 * }
 * || 233.7 || 227.8
 * }

Since 80% of the population in the South is employed in agriculture, much of the U.S. aid to South Vietnam in the years right after 1954, (estimated at over $1-billion), went to rehabilitate the agrarian economy and to settle some 900,000 refugees. The ever-present threat of invasion from the North, and large scale subversive activities has required continued expenditure by the new government to give unusually heavy support to its national security forces. The South now is self-sufficient in basic food-stuffs, but has no heavy industry.

The situation map at MAAG in Saigon early this month shows the South's major current problem at a glance: the Communist internal security threat. (Map attached)

The Communist "National Liberation Front" claims that the Communists will "liberate" the South in 1961. The main reliance is on Communist armed forces, now estimated at about 10,000, who have been infiltrated into the South from the North (overland through Cambodia and Laos, or by sea in coastal junks), and who fight as guerrillas. These are the Viet Cong.

As the Free Vietnamese become more effective at countering these Communist guerrillas, (in January and February, the government initiated 529 attacks on the guerrillas, compared to 310, attacks initiated by the Viet Cong), the Communists have been forced to consider further means for winning. Current Communist plans include:

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