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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 Page  of telegram to  c. Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war and assure a mobile offensive capability for the Army.

3. Before setting in motion the joint effort outlined above, the United States Government would need confirmation of its acceptability by the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the measures it is prepared to take under the broad headings listed in para 2 above in order to ensure the success of this joint effort. The foregoing subheadings under para 2 are purposely broadly phrased so as to permit you to spell out specifics in manner you feel will be most effective. We realize that the U.S. cannot successfully dictate from here precisely what measures the GVN should take since they might be unworkable in the circumstances peculiar to South Viet-Nam and necessarily must leave these details and manner of their negotiation with Diem to your judgment. However, it is most important that Diem come forth with changes which will be recognized as having real substance and meaning. Rightly or wrongly his regime is widely criticized abroad and in the U.S., and if we are to give our substantial support we must be able to point to real administrative political and social reforms and a real effort to widen its base that will give maximum confidence to the American people, as well as to world opinion that our efforts ere not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffective regime, but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GVN against a Communist take-over. You should make this quite clear and indicate that the U.S. contribution to the proposed joint effort depends heavily upon his response to this point.

4. It Rh