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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET d. Any craft not following normal routes, or landing at other than controlled ports, to be considered suspect and reported/investigated/destroyed.

e. Land operations on coasts, rivers, and in Delta MUST include Naval planning and be jointly conducted to insure maximum results.

5. :

a. Reluctance of Vietnamese Navy to accept US Navy advice

b. Gaining acceptance of USN personnel as working and advisory members in OpCon/Intel centers and aboard ship.

c. Getting the Vietnamese Navy really accepted and written into RVNAF operations and intelligence plans in the Counter-Insurgency effort.

d. Increasing rate at which the Vietnamese Navy can man and operate the craft and equipment which is not available and that can be made available. Problems are recruitment, training and increased personnel ceiling.

e. Establishing effective command and control organization, with necessary coordination between the Vietnamese agencies necessary to make the concept work. (The ships, craft, and boats are only one element in the overall surveillance/interdiction operation.)

Rh
 * Rear Admiral H. S. Persons, USN, and officers of CINCPAC Staff including a Coast Guard Officer, are now in Vietnam to assist in planning for the integration of the Vietnamese Navy