Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/376

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The aim of this memorandum is to outline a plan and the measures required for the clearance of the communists from the Delta area.

2. The overall aim of any counter insurgency plan must be to win the people. The killing of communist terrorists will follow automatically from that. If the main emphasis is placed merely on killing terrorists there is a grave risk that more communists will be created than are killed. Winning the people must, therefore, be kept in the forefront of the minds of every single person, whether military or civilian, who is engaged in anti-terrorist operations.

3. There is a very similar terrain throughout the whole area of rice fields and swamp, with mangrove on the coast. The area is at present divided into 12 provinces with two tactical zones (the seven southern provinces and five northern provinces) in each of which a military division is stationed. At the present time there is inadequate direction and co-ordination of the campaign with the result that the 12 provinces are tending to fight separate battles and the communists are able to take advantage of the boundaries between the respective spheres of responsibility.

4. We should therefore establish a Combined Headquarters for the area to direct and co-ordinate:


 * (a) all anti-terrorist operations;


 * (b) all civilian emergency measures;


 * (c) all security intelligence;


 * (d) information and propaganda; ;and


 * (e) as a follow up, social improvements.

It is logical that these Headquarters should be the present 3rd Corps reinforced by Administrative, Civil Guard, Self-Defence Corps and Propaganda elements. There is great advantage in the fact that the Corps Headquarters itself is based in the Saigon area where the best facilities for control are available.

5. This would make it desirable to relieve this headquarters of any responsibility for the 31st tactical zone and for the special zone of Saigon, and it is for consideration whether these two zones could best be handled by Field Army Headquarters as a separate command Rh