Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/335

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  b. A secondary effort, or threat thereof, by about nine Chinese Communists divisions into Burma and Northern Thailand, which could be supported as follows:


 * (1) Three divisions, one lightly equipped, to northern Thailand via northwest Burma.


 * (2) Six divisions toward Rangoon along the Burma Road and via Myitkyina to Mandalay, then south in the internal transport system of Burma.

c. There would probably be a build-up in North Vietnam and possibly a build-up along the China-Burma border before any invasion was initiated. The invasion would probably be on the broadest possible front employing lightly equipped troops to infiltrate between defending forces and thereby minimizing the effects of nuclear weapons against deployed ground troops. These infiltrating forces would be supported by columns advancing quickly down main routes. Battalion-size or smaller airborne units might be used, chiefly to seize and hold key features such as bridges, airfields, critical road junctions. The communists would exploit to the fullest their ability to infiltrate through the most difficult country and would not necessarily be tied to the highways and roads. Large numbers of porters and pack animals would be available and jungle trails would be used to a great extent, though this would restrict the speed of attack and the weight of equipment that could be used. Rh