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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  Vietnam from the Communists by building something worth a man's life to preserve. If it's a good program, we should encourage one strong political opposition to emerge, without endangering the national security. Here is where out political skill needs to be used. This political work is needed as a matter of grave urgency. Unless a constructive outlet is found quickly, the opposition in Saigon is going to explode in violence again and the Viet Cong are wide awake to exploit it this time.

It was a shock to me to look over maps of the estimated situation with U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence personnel, as well as, with president Diem who held similar grim views. The Communist Viet Gong now dominate much of the 1st and 5th Military Regions, as well as being active in spots in other regions, according to these estimates. The probable strength of the Communist armed forces in South Vietnam was given to me in various guesses from 3.000 to 15,000. My guess is that the strength is now closer to the latter figure and that only Hanoi knows accurately.

This strength estimate by itself isn't what shocked me. The shocking par-t was to realize that the thousands of disciplined and trained Communist graduates of "proletarian military science" had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and to gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions and for a few highly-localized spots where loyal paramilitary forces (Civil Guards and Sel£-Defnese Corps) have undertaken inspired counter-guerrilla actions or where villagers work closely with the military.

The Viet Cong ha;e the initiative and most of the control over the region from the jungled foothills of the High Plateau north of Saigon all the way south down to the Gulf of Siam, excluding the big city area of Saigon-Cholon. This is Vietnam's "bread-basket" where most of its rice and rubber are grown.

Unlike the Philippines or Malaya, the Communists cannot-be cordoned off at the country's borders and then dealt with as an internal security problem alone. The borders of Vietnam are long and include some of the most difficult terrain in the world to patrol. It is apparent that many of the Viet Cong infiltrate from Cambodia, particularly from Svayrieng Province. Also, southeastern Laos has a reported Communist Rh