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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 Rh largely a self-supporting operation in respect to recruitment and supplies. The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail. Most of their arms and much of their ammunition have been locally acquired or captured from GVN Army and security forces.

5. We estimate present armed, full·time Viet Cong strength at about 16,000, an increase, despite substantial combat losses, of 12,000 since April of 1960 and of 1,000 in the past three months. About 10–20 percent of total Viet Cong strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North Vietnam mostly via mountain trails through southern Laos. Most of the remaining 80–90 percent of the Viet Cong are local recruits, but they also include remnants of the approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground during the 1953-1955 regroupment and evacuation of Vietnamese Communist Army units following the Indochina War. Approximately 90,000 Vietnamese Communist troops were evacuated to North Vietnam during this period, most of whom were from south and central Vietnam. It is from this pool of experienced fighters that most of the guerrilla cadres now operating in South Vietnam are drawn. These hard-core guerrillas are augmented by several thousand supporters who, under the cover of normal civilian pursuits, join the organized insurgent bands to assist in intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, and terrorist operations. In addition, local inhabitants in many areas provide the Viet Cong with recruits, food, refuge, and operational support, in some cases voluntarily and in others as the result of intimidation or coercion.

6. As part of the buildup for their current campaign, the Viet Cong have established an extensive communications network. Much of the communications equipment in use is probably quite primitive and some of it is assembled in the field. There is evidence, however, that in addition there are substantial quantities of sophisticated communications equipment and well-trained technicians serving the Viet Congo. Such equipment and the necessary maintenance and operating personnel were infiltrated into South Vietnam.

7. There has been no positive identification of Bloc manufactured military equipment in South Vietnam. Most of the arms and equipment now in use by the Viet Cong is of US or French origin. Although weapons have been infiltrated from North Vietnam, most Viet Cong equipment is probably from caches established at the end of the Indochina War or is equipment captured from GVN armed forces or security forces. During 1960, over 3,000 small arms were lost by GVN armed forces during combat. Some items, such as grenades, land mines, booby traps, and small arms ammunition are locally manufactured by village level Viet Cong "arsenals," from materials procured locally or imported from North Vietnam and Cambodia. Moreover, in view of the physical problems of infiltrating large amounts of arms and ammunition into South Vietnam, many Viet Cong operations are primarily for the purpose of capturing arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and other equipment. A major buildup of Bloc equipment in South Vietnam is likely to await the improvement of lines of communication into and within South Vietnam.

8. Outlook. Viet Cong control of the Ca Mau peninsula at the southern tip of South Vietnam has been virtually complete for several years, During the dry season beginning in November, the Viet Cong will probably intensify the exploitation of GVN weaknesses in the plateau areas of the north and central parts of the country, seeking to establish another "liberated area " as a logistics base from which larger scale operations could be mounted. The creation of a second "liberated area" in the plateau region adjacent to southern Laos would enable the Viet Cong to keep GVN forces split and prevent the concentration of effort against either. Moreover a strong Viet Cong position in the plateau area would seriously threaten the rear of Diem's troops posted along the demilitarized zone. Rh