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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  of last May to remove some of its critical (but admittedly weak) members; he has increased the authority of officials helpful to him during the 1960 coup attempt, as in the case of Brig. Gen. Nguyen Khanh; and he has established a "political commissar" system in the armed services ostensibly to conduct political indoctrination programs but probably also to strengthen Diem's informant and control mechanism. According to recant reports, Diem has crested a "Military Task Force" of trusted military leaders and units which would be prepared to move quickly against any attempted coup.

At the sane time Diem appears to have realized the some liberalization of his prevasivepervasive [sic] personal role in running the government is necessary. To date Diem's political reforms have been modest and appear to be motivated more by practical considerations, i,e persistent US urging and increased US aid, than by any change in his political convictions, Among other things, he has permitted the "election" of youth representatives to village councils in a number of southern provinces, though tho representatives come from the government's Republican Youth Organization. He hes sought to improve the quality of local government officials and has disciplined and removed (with adequate publicity) an increasing number of those guilty of graft, excessive harshness, and ineffectiveness in office. He has allowed (probably ordered) the National Assembly to indulge in slightly more open debate of government-sponsored legislation and occasionally to question publicly cabinet members on the operation of their departments. Restrictions over the press have been relaxed somewhat and, with the exception of those involved in last year's coup attempt, the opposition has not been actively harassed. Finally, he has made a number of administrative changes within the military establishment designed to improve its effectiveness and ostensibly to delegate greater authority to its hierarchy.

C.

Diem's system of rule remains essentially unchanged. As before, his personal impress is upon almost every aspect of the government and he continues to make all important decisions as well as many less important ones. What limited authority his subordinates possess, from the secretaries of state heading cabinet departments down to middle-level operational personnel, is largely determined by their personal standing with him rather than by formal legal requirements. Even his close advisers, including members of his own family, are balanced against each other and operate in relative obscurity, never being permitted to share the public spotlight focused on Ngo Dinh Diem. Thus, while he maintains the form of constitutional government, ha directs the bureaucracy largely on a personal basis and with the help of an "inner circle" of advisors, bound to him by family ties and personal loyalty, operating largely outside the formal government structure, and extending their controls throughout the national and local bureaucracy. Rh