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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

A.

President Diem's leadership and the stability of his government have been more seriously questioned during the past year or so than at any time since he consolidated his authority in 1955–56. Since the beginning of 1960, criticism of Diem has increased substantially in various sectors of the Vietnamese society but has been more urgently articulated within the government bureaucracy itself, including the military establishment. A wide range of officials including Vice President Nguyan Ngoo Tho and other important members of the cabinet, the bureaucracy, and the military have privately questioned Diem's handling of the internal, security problem and his ability to rally and lead the people against the Communists during what they regard as the most critical period since the end of the Indochina war. Their concern with the Communist threat, however, is almost inseparably entwined with an accumulation of grievances principally over Diem's failure to delegate responsibility, the power exercised by some of Diem's close advisors, particularly his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, and the use of the, the government's semicovert political apparatus, to police the attitudes and loyalty of the government bureaucracy. This discontent culminated in a near-successful military coup effort in Saigon in November 1960.

Open deprecation of Diem's leadership hes increased sharply among intellectual-elite circles and disgruntled ex-politicians in Saigon, the focal point of non-Communist political opposition to Diem since 1956, and to a lesser extent, among labor and business elements. They have consistently and, on occasion, vociferously demanded that Diem liberalize and reform the regime, lift restrictions on civil liberties, and permit an opposition to operate. These demands have been supported by a disparate group of anti-Diem Vietnamese expatriates in Paris who have long advocated Diem's removal. There is little likelihood, however, that the activities of the Saigon opposition will contribute appreciably to any immediate political crisis in South Vietnam. Their leaders are largely opportunists and political idealists with political views covering a wide spectrum, including neutralist, They are not believed to have support within the upper echelon of the government have little poplar appeal outside Saigon and expatriate Vietnamese communities, and have been consistently unable to maintain unity within their own ranks or to agree on a principal leader or spokesman. A number of them were involved in coup attempt last year, but there is no reliable evidence that they had entered into any close planning or understanding with tho military coup leaders. Rh