Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/293

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Since the cessation of tho Indochina hostilities and the partition of of Vietnam at the 17th parallel in 1954 by the Geneva Conference, the DRV, while holding over the Republic of Vietnam an implied threat of eventual invasion by its numerically superior military forces, has used armed guerrilla and terrorist warfare, penetration, sabotage, bluster and propaganda in an effort to weaken and disrupt its rival and eventually extend Communist control over all of Vietnam. These activities have been carried out by a covert Communist subversive apparatus of armed cadres and political agents, commonly known as the , left behind by the DRV after it withdrew most of its military forces to the north in 1954 and reinforced since then by infiltration from North Vietnam and by recruitment locally. In the meantime, the DRV has assiduously attempted to give the impression that it abides in every detail with the Geneva Accords and has urged the holding of Vietnam-wide elections (as provided or by the Geneva Accords) and the unification of the country.

A.

1. . From 1954 to about 1957 Communist subversive activities in South Vietnam were largely non-violent, in line with tho DRV's new tactics of maximizing the "political" struggle and minimizing the "armed" struggle as the means to bring about the downfall of the precariously weak Diem government. The Communist leadership in Hanoi probably viewed the future with confidence in view of the political chaos and economic dislocation prevailing in the South. However, the success of Diem and his lieutenants in forging a stable government and an effective armed force to withstand both Communist and non-Communist subversive pressures and in moving rapidly against critical economic problems (with considerable US assistance) and Diem's persistent refusal to enter into any political negotiations with the DRV (much less permit area-wide elections under conditions which would assure a Communist majority), contributed to a readjustment in Communist tactics. Other probable contributing factors were the concern of the DRV leadership over South Vietnam's increasingly close alignment with the US, considerable progress by the Communist regime in consolidating its control in North Vietnam, and the poor morale of the hard pressed Communist apparatus in South Vietnam.



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