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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

As desired by you, I visited Vietnam 2–14 January 1961. After twelve days of intensive looking and listening over some old familiar ground, I have come to the following personal convictions:

a. 1961 promises to be a fateful year for Vietnam.

b. The Communist Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel this year, if at all possible, and are much further along towards accomplishing this objective than I had realized from reading the reports received in Washington.

c. The free Vietnamese, and their government, probably will be able to do no more than postpone eventual defeat - - unless they find a Vietnamese way of mobilizing their total resources and then utilizing them with spirit.

d. The U. S. team in Vietnam will be unable to help the Vietnamese with real effectiveness, unless the U. S. system of their operation is changed sufficiently to free these Americans to do the job that needs doing, and unless they do it with sensitive understanding and wisdom.

e. If Free Vietnam is won by the Communists, the remainder of Southeast Asia will be easy pickings for our enemy, because the toughest local force on our side will be gone. A Communist victory also would be a major blow to U. S. prestige and influence, not only in Asia but throughout the world, since the world believes that Vietnam has remained free only through U. S. help. Such a victory would tell leaders of other governments that it doesn't pay to be a friend of the U. S., and would be an even more marked lesson than Laos.

f. Vietnam can be kept free, but it will require a changed U. S. attitude, plenty of hard work and patience, and a new spirit by the Vietnamese. The Viet Cong have been pushing too hard militarily to get their roots down firmly and can be defeated by an inspired and determined effort.