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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 Security prospects over the next year, however, may well be influenced more by developments in neighboring Laos than by the extent to which the Diem government can improve the effectiveness of its military and security forces. If Laos comes under predominantly Communist control, Communist capabilities in South Vietnam would almost certainly be strengthened to a degree unprecdentedunprecedented [sic] since 1954. Southern Laos could become the most important base for Communist operations against South Vietnam. In this event, the level of Communist insurgency might assume the proportions of widespread guerrilla warfare and some areas would probably come under complete Communist control, within which Hanoi might attempt to establish a Communist but ostensibly independent government with both military and political support from the Bloc, Vietnam's agricultural economy would suffer further and urban centers probably would be increasingly subjected to Communist guerrilla and terrorist attacks designed to heighten anxiety in the centers of government power and spark a non-Communist coup effort.

In the face of a Communist offensive of such proportions, South Vietnam would be required to make a maximum military effort in order to survive. There would be no immediate collapse. In the long run, however, the maintenance of South Vietnam's independence would rest principally on the nature and amount of US support and on a maximum effort by the South Vietnamese Government to develop the political, psychological, and economic programs required to gain and retain popular support.

The stability of the government during the next year or so, will depend principally on Diem's handling of the security situation. If Diem can demonstrate a continuing improvement in security conditions, he should be able to strengthen his position, alleviate concern and boost morale within his bureaucracy and military establishment, and lessen the urgency with which many of the members view the current situation. However, if the fight against the CommnuniCommunists [sic] goes poorly or the South Vietnamese Army suffers heavy casualties, the chances of a coup would substantially increase. Moreover, a coup may be attempted at any time. The odds favor a coup if security declines appreciably further, particularly if accompanied by a virtual Communist takeover of Laos.

Any coup attempt during the next year or so is likely to be non-CommuniCommunist [sic] in leadership, involving army elements and civilian officials and perhaps some disgruntled oppositionists outside the government. The participating elements probably would be broader than those involved in the 1960 attempt, would have greater popular support, and would be better prepared to execute their plan quickly and successfully. Moreover, a major split within the military leadership does not appear likely; most of the generals probably would elect to remain uncommitted at the outset of the coup, as they apparently did in November 1960, adding their tacit or active support to whatever side they judged likely to win. Under these circumstances, a military coup attempt would have better than an even chance to succeed.

Diem's removal--whether by a military coup, assassination death, from accidental or natural causes--would considerably strengthen the power of the military. The odds appear about even between a movement led by Rh