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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

strikes unknown out of the jungles, swamps or mountains and then fades away again. To prevent this, the RVNAF must penetrate and control these Viet Cong safe areas. Although the key to success is the spirit of the offensive, to permit the guerrilla to retain the initiative is to court ultimate defeat. The Vietnamese Forces, to an ever increasing degree, must continue to carry the fight to the enemy, rather than permit him to select the time and place for battle. Larger guerrilla units must be hit in their assembly areas and smaller groups must be hunted down and destroyed they are able to accomplish their mission. This, of course, requires improved patrolling and training, a climate of assistance by the population to ensure accurate, timely intelligence, the ultimate in offensive spirit together with tactical innovation at all levels, and the highest order of small unit leadership. Our current training programs are oriented in this direction but much remains to be done to ensure maximum results.

This concludes my discussion, Mr. President. Although we have previously touched on many of these matters in our many discussions, I felt I should review the considerable accomplishments we have made as a cooperative team, and highlight those areas in which I feel further corrections and improvements are required.

I am confident that, by continuing to work together we can build an efficient fighting force, led by commanders duly invested with adequate command authority, and the fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces of Vietnam will continue to improve. Rh