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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

divisions, regiments and battalions is to provide a coordinated, smooth functioning team, capable of applying the proper degree of combat power to fit the specific situation. The commanders of such units, through prior training exercises, have developed a team, they know their subordinates personally - they understand the unit's capabilities and limitations. Such is not normally true with "provisoire" organizations.

OVEREMPHASIS ON TERRAIN OBJECTIVES:

Junior leaders tend to become "fixed" upon a particular terrain objective and there have been instances where opportunities to destroy VC have been lost in order to occupy a terrain objective on schedule. The solution lies in increased emphasis on the job of killing Viet Cong. Subordinate commanders must be constantly reminded that their primary mission is to destroy the Viet Cong who normally hit and then run to avoid casualties.

IMPROPER AND INSUFFICIENT USE OF AIR AND ARTILLERY:

Air and Artillery support are weapons the VC do not possess and cannot effectively counter. Their advantages must be exploited to the maximum. In many instances commanders do not adequately plan in advance for this support. Air support of operations, properly planned, coordinated with the ground forces, and timely executed, provides the ground commander extremely effective support. Too often, ground artillery support of operations has been unobserved fire by means of map coordinates. This is the most ineffective type of fire support and should rarely be used. Artillery support, for maximum effectiveness, must be observed and adjusted by observers on the ground with the forces being supported or in the air and in communication with the ground forces. Artillery and air support, where applicable, must be preplanned and integrated into the overall plan for all major operations.

NEED FOR AN OFFENSIVE SPIRIT:

Despite improvement in this area, there is still too much reliance on defensive operations and reaction to Viet Cong initiative rather than taking the actual initiative ourselves. The ultimate solution does not lie in defending against the guerrilla, but in boldly and energetically attacking him. Anti-guerrilla fighters must gain and maintain the initiative and truly become the hunter rather than the hunted. The Viet Cong often retains the initiative, even though we take the offensive. This is because he

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