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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  As of 31 May 1961, there was a cumulative shortage of 568 civilian personnel from the 4,821 authorized for the 150,000 RVNAF force level. No new authorizations have been made to provide the increased capability required for the 20,000 men increase and the MAP support of the 68,000 Civil Guard force. Additional permanent as well as temporary civilian personnel are most urgently needed so that the technical services will be able to properly receive, account for, store, issue, and maintain the significant tonnage of supplies and equipment scheduled to arrive on an accelerated basis beginning in mid-July. Although an interdepartmental commission has been established to solve this problem, little progress has been made in augmenting the civilian technical force. The inability of your technical services to process these supplies could will retard the entire training and supply program. As MAAG has made the urgency of this program its main reason for budgetary recommendations, this must not happen.

I know that you share my concern that the officers and men of Vietnam's militaryn and para-military forces should be well uniformed and equipped as individuals. The transfer of the military clothing factory from its present inadequate quarters on Dai Lo Tran Hung Dao to a more spacious facility in the Quartier Pasteur is a matter of the greatest urgency. The capacity of the existing uniform factory, 35,000 combat uniforms per month, is entirely inadequate to meet the demand - particularly since the supported forces basis has been greatly increased -and the shortage will become more critical by mid-July. New power sewing machines have been procured from the U.S. but the modification to the new facility will not be completed until some time after the arrival of these machines in Saigon. In addition to action already in progress, I feel that we must take additional urgent action solve this problem as soon as possible.

One final major military matter I would like to mention has to do with the all important continued improvement of ARVN tactical operations. As a result of its responsibility for continuing analysis of operations against the VC, my staff has developed a synthesis of what appear to be recurring weaknesses in the preparation for, and the conduct of, tactical operations by GVN forces. I have discussed these from time to time with appropriate RVNAF general officers and shall, of course, continue these discussion in the future. I have also furnished General Minh with full details of the MAAG analysis. There are seven general areas which require the continued attention of all concerned in order to achieve the desired improvement. Briefly stated, they are:

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