Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/261

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 I am sure you agree that the military chain of command, to be effective must be respected by all - both subordinates and superiors alike. Confidence in the command structure is fundamental to military operations and I am convinced that a national plan for counter-insurgency cannot successfully be administered without it. Naturally, if commanders are bypassed or their orders countermanded, they are unable to make effective plans and it is most difficult to execute successful operations within their assigned areas of responsibility.

Of course, unforseen circumstances will often develop requiring the immediate commitment of security forces in a particular area. Provided such a requirement is levied through the normal chain of military command, the can normally be accomplished with minimum disruption of training, security and operations against the Viet Cong. In this respect, I have received reports recently indicating that major command elements have been bypassed, both up and down the chain of command.

In this regard, I must also report that in establishing the new chain of military command, in certain cases problems have been encountered in defining the role of the Province Chief within that chain. The directives are clear that the Province Chief, in his role of a military commander, is within the military chain of command. However, above and beyond the normal Civil Guard Force which has been assigned to each province, the Province Chief should not automatically assume command of all military units physically present in his province, but should command only those forces allocated to him by his next higher military superior, normally the Division Tactical Zone Commander. This arrangement is, of course parallel to the system at the Corps level, which seems to be understood by all. For example, the Corps Commander does not command units of the General RVNAF Reserve merely because they are physically present in his Corps Tactical Zone. Rather, such units must be allocated by Field Command or JGS before the Corps Commander exercises command or control. I feel it essential that the same principle prevail at Province level. While I fully understand the dual capacity of Province Chiefs as military and civil leaders, I feel that this dual position must be brought into harmony with the need for clear-cut command channels and unit assignments on the military side. Otherwise, piecemeal assignment, as already reported, of ARVN battalions to Province Chiefs could well result in the conduct of 37 miniature campaigns - each one proceeding at its own pace and intensity, rather than a national campaign against the Viet Cong in accordance with a cohesive, coordinated plan.

Rh