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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  will not actually participate in hot war activities. MAAG has arranged for the same authorization from U.S. military authorities. In addition, RVNAF officers have been encouraged to work closely with U.S. advisors in the all important operational planning phase which needs additional emphasis.

Also in the field of operations, I am particularly pleased at the improvements realized in Air-Ground operations. The reaction time on requests for air support and for airborne forces has been significantly reduced as a result of improved operational procedures worked out, with MAAG advice, between your Army and Air Force. In this regard, a concept has been developed employing a specially trained force of company-size, on constant airfield alert, with another company-size force equally trained in H-34 helicopter operations, on camp alert. This ready force, coupled with the airborne capability will materially increase the ability of the RVNAF to counter widely dispersed guerrilla attacks. This, of course, requires that the primary use of these H-34's be operational and not administrative.

The foregoing, Mr. President, are only some of the achievements we have realized in the past few months. They result from close cooperation between the RVNAF and MAAG. It is this type of cooperation which we both must re-emphasize in order to continue our progress toward victory over the Viet Cong guerrillas.

As you know, I am convinced, and I have repeatedly given assurances to my superiors that the GVN has the will and determination as well as the ability to achieve victory if provided with required U.S. support and GVN accepted and implemented the military and other supporting recommendations contained in the Counter-Insurgency Plan. I am sure you will agree from recent events that the United States will render the required support. We both know that there is general acceptance of the Counter-Insurgency recommendations in principle on the part of the GVN. However, there are certain specifics regarding their military implications which I would now like to take up with you, together with some other closely related MAAG recommendations.

One of the major recommendations of the proposed Counter-Insurgency Plan was that a National Internal Security Council be established to promulgate the policy for and to coordinate the preparation and execution of a Vietnamese National Counter-Insurgency Plan, incorporating the political, economic, psychological, and military aspects of that plan. I realize the

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