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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 II.

A. MILITARY-INTERNAL SECURITY ACTION

1.

The Communist-inspired insurgency in Viet Nam, which is aimed at the destruction of the authority and prestige of the established government, is assumed to be a prelude to further attempted inroads designed ultimately to absorb the entire country into the Communist Bloc. North of the 17th parallel, The Communist-led Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) with the help of international Communism has the capability of overtly defeating the present military forces of Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam, either singly or in combination. It is the primary source of support and cadres for the Viet Cong efforts to gain control of Viet Na,. Current intelligence estimates indicate that, rather than resorting to overt attack, the Communist Block probably will continue, through the DRV, to exploit the use of insurgent forces as long as it appears to them that such action might succeed in bringing about the downfall of the GVN.

Although the threat of overt attack by DRV forces presently exists, the most pressing problem, from a military viewpoint, is the destruction and elimination of the approximately 12,000 DRV supported and inspired Viet Cong guerrillas presently conducting insurgency operations within the borders of Viet Nam. The increase in Viet Cong strength and activities since late 1959 has resulted in the commitment of approximately 90 per cent of the combat forces of the RVNAF to counter-insurgency operations. This heavy commitment has enabled the RVNAF to begin to take the offensive, but more military forces are

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