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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  increasing the sense of uncertainty and fear throughout the official government of South Vietnam.

2. Taking the se military considerations into account, the problem of preventing Communist domination of South Vietnam can be broken down into:

a. :

These have been carefully worked out and coordinated within the U.S. Government in the form of a counter-insurgency plan {CIP} for Vietnam. This plan has been presented to President Diem and is to be implemented as rapidly as possible as he approves the various specific elements of the plan. In support of the CIP, the President at the NSC Meeting of 29 April 1961 approved the actions listed under Part I of the Military Section of the proposed Program.

b. :

Communist capabilities to infiltrate personnel and equipment into South Vietnam across either the Lao or the Cambodia border will be facilitated by the cover provided by the cease~fire and the forthcoming Fourteen-Power Conference. Along the Laos-G.V.N. boundary, the extremely rugged nature of the terrain makes it almost impossible to establish a "water-tight" border. However, this same rugged terrain limits the smuggling routes to one principal road, (the east-west highway from Savannakhet to Tchepone to Quang Tri) and to some 12–15 reasonably passable trails. Rh