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TOP SECRET 44. In order to prevent Lao neutrality from veering toward pro-Communism, encourage individuals and groups in Laos who oppose dealing with the Communist blowbloc [sic].

45. Develop an attitude of confidence on the part of the leaders that the UN Charter, SEATO, and U. S. support provide a favorable basis for Lao resistance to Communist pressure and inducements.

46. Encourage and support close bonds between Laos and Thailand; including such political associations, economic cooperation, and joint military planning as feasible.

47. Support the expansion and reorganization of police, propaganda, and army intelligence services, provided anti-Communist elements maintain effective control of these Services.

48. Continue support of the Royal Lao Army to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the Viet Minh.

49. Terminate economic and military aid if the Lao Government ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence.

50. Promote the development of Thai leadership which is increasingly united, stable and constructive, is supported by the Thai people, and willing to continue the alignment of Thailand with the United States and the West.

51. Utilize Thailand's central location in Southeast Asia as a point from which to create discontent and internal difficulties within nearby Communist-dominated areas and thwart Communist subversive efforts in neighboring free countries, to a degree consistent with U. S. policies and programs in neighboring free countries.

52. Provide military assistance to Thailand for support of forces sufficient:


 * . To maintain internal security.

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