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Rh other foreign officials Diem has become very frank in admitting that many of the civilian administrators have been incompetent and have abused their power. He has added he is removing these and placing competent men in their jobs whose principal duty will be to pay attention to the needs of the population and make every effort to win their confidence. The President has become quite aware of the adverse reaction of the people to indiscriminate use of methods of coercion in carrying out the government's programs in rural areas. He explained to the Ambassador at some length on February 22 the urgent need for civilian officials to explain in detail the reasons for the government's actions in these matters in order that the population will fully understand how they will benefit in the long run.

Ngo Dinh NHU, the President's brother and political advisor, also told CAS on February 5 that the security forces need more anti-guerrilla training. He added, however, that political measures are the real key to defense against the VC attacks, and mentioned specifically that GVN officials should consider political aspects of a situation and not just concentrate on rapid physical results to please the President.

In late January Vice President Nguyen Ngoc THO, according to a CAS report, had a discussion with President Diem in which he pointed out his belief that the reports which the President had been receiving on internal security were incorrect as they underestimated the size of the VC network in South Vietnam. He reportedly reminded the President that he had told him a year and a half ago that the GVN did not have a correct estimate of VC strength and, unless this were obtained, the time would come when the country would be unable to cope with VC subversion. Privately Tho was said to have placed the blame for GVN loss of support among the peasantry on province chiefs whose only activity was to apply police powers strictly. He also was said to have indicated that both Ngo Dinh Nhu and the NRM leaders, through the province chiefs, were responsible for providing completely erroneous and optimistic reports about the security situation. In a conversation with Ambassador Durbrow shortly after the Tay Ninh attack Tho expressed concern over the seriousness of the internal security situation, and he also urged more anti-guerrilla training of the GVN security forces.

Lieutenant General Le van TY, Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army, has also expressed the view that further anti-guerrilla training is required. In addition, according to MAAG, soon after the Tay Ninh attack a meeting was held by the Assistant Secretary of Defense with the Chief of Staff and Corps and Field Commanders at which it was decided to make certain recommendations to the President. These recommendations included adherence to the chain Rh