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 28. There are means open to the United States to reduce Communist China's influence in the Far East and at the same time undertake positive action to counter the Communists' threats and their use of force in the area. One of these would be provision in the U.S. long-range policy for support of some form of military activities by certain nations against Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. These actions, which could include reconnaissance in force, nuisance raids, probes, limited objective attacks and actions to rectify boundaries would be carried out without overt U.S. support. In such situations it is improbable that the USSR, with the miscalculation on Korea still fresh in is memory, would overtly participate. This fact, plus the lack, of capability of the opponents to destroy one another without big power interference, would tend to:


 * . Limit the size o the conflicts;


 * . Put strains upon the relations of the Chinese Communists ans the USSR;


 * . Keep the Bloc satellites, North Korea and North Vietnam off balance;


 * . Be a sporadic drain upon the resources of Communist China (and to a lesser degree upon the USSR) to supply these countries.

This would not be a wholly new policy, but a return in general to the one adopted by the United States toward the GRC operations against Communist Chine prior to the Korean War. Since it is obvious that neither purely defensive moves made to meet actions initiated by the Communists, nor concessions made in an effort to appease them will relieve the tensions or resolve the issues in the area, it is possible that condoning the military activities would regain for the Free World a certain degree of initiative in the Far East. Rh