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TOP SECRET and feasible include the use of U. S. military forces either locally or against the external source of such subversion or rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be the source).


 * 10..


 * . Make every possible effort, not openly inconsistent with the U. S. position as to the armistice agreements, to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintain and support friendly non-Communist governments in Cambodia and Laos, to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam, and. to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.


 * . Urge that the French promptly recognize and deal with Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam as independent sovereign nations.


 * . Strengthen U. S. representation and deal directly, wherever advantageous to the U. S., with the governments of Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam.


 * . Working through the French only insofar as necessary, assist Cambodia, Laos and Free Vietnam to maintain (1) military forces necessary for internal security and (2) economic conditions conducive to thee maintenance and strength of non-Communist regimes and comparing favorably with those in adjacent Communist areas.


 * . Aid emigration from North Vietnam and resettlement of peoples unwilling to remain under Communist rule.


 * . Exploit available means to make more difficult the control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam.


 * . Exploit available means to prevent North Vietnam from becoming permanently incorporated in the Soviet bloc, using as feasible and desirable consular relations and non-strategic trade.


 * . Conduct covert operations on a large and scale in support of the foregoing polices.

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