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 creation of a new National Army. However, as seen from this Department, there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the U.S. undertaking a training program for the Vietnamese National Army while at the same time the French forces commence a gradual phasing out from that theater.

As for the point you raised regarding the limitations of the Geneva settlement, in the view of this Department there is a limitation on the degree to which the Vietnamese armed forces can be increased. However, in my opinion, there is no provision of the cease-fire agreement regarding Viet Nam which would prevent the existing MAAG Saigon from undertaking a training mission or which would impede MAAG Saigon from rotating existing personnel to bring in number for number new personnel especially versed in military training.

In the case of Cambodia there is no obstacle whatever to the setting up of a U.S. training mission. The cease-fire agreement affecting Cambodia provides in Chapter III Article 7 that the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war materiel, personnel or instructors. This latter clause makes it entirely possible for the Cambodian Government to request a foreign training mission and for the U.S., if it so desires, to provide such a mission. In the opinion of this Department, it would be most helpful to the furtherance of our national policy in Indochina if the U.S. should reply affirmatively to the letter of the Defense Minister cited above, and it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs give their consent to the establishment of a MAAG/Phnom Penh which would provide both training and logistical assistance to the Royal Khmer Army. The Department of State likewise feels that sympathetic consideration should be given to the establishment of a training mission in MAAG Saigon to assist in the development of an effective Vietnamese National Army.

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