Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/73

 Aug 18, 1954

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received your letter of August 12, 1954, setting forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on requests from the Governments of the Associated States of Indochina for United States assistance in training the indigenous forces of these states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established four preconditions for United States particIpation in such a training program and you add the further consideration that an international interpretation of the cease-fire agreement may in any event impose limitations on the extent of military training, as well as end item assistance, that could be undertaken by the United States in Indochina.

The first precondition of the Joint Chiefs is that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control of the Indochinese states requesting United States assistance. This condition applies to the Government of Cambodia which is strong, stable and enjoys the whole-hearted loyalty of the population. A similar situation likewise exists in Laos but there, because of the restrictive terms of the cease-fire agreement and likewise because the Laotian Government has never made a request for U.S. training assistance, the problem does not arise. In the case of Free Viet Nam, the civil government, which has been under the presidency of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem for only slightly more than a month, is far from strong or stable. However, we are currently perfecting measures which may assist that Government rapidly to increase the effectiveness of its administration. I should like to point out that one of the most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National Army and in training that army. This is, of course, the familarfamiliar [sic] hen-and-egg argument as to which comes first but I would respectfully submit that the U.S. could profitably undertake two courses of action in Free Viet Nam: The Honorable

Charles E. Wilson,M

Secretary of Defense.

Rh