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 :". The execution of no one of the four alternative courses of action with respect to Communist China would properly serve U.S. long-range interests, nor discharge the responsibility which the American people have to mankind for leadership of the Free World. There are elements in each of these courses, which combined, could constitute a preferable and proper course of action. WE DO NOT HAVE EITHER TO APPEASE COMMUNIST CHINA (ALTERNATIVE "A") OR TO DESTROY IT (ALTERNATIVE "D").


 * ". In deciding upon a course of action, the first and basic need, which I think NSC 162/2 does not meet, is for a statement in a single document of a U.S. foreign policy on a global basis, with the principal OBJECTIVES listed. Assuming that one of these would be the one stated in paragraph above, it does not follow that its attainment requires the destruction of the military power of Communist China. In fact, I would regard the destruction of such military power as inimical to the long-range interests of the U.S. It would result in the creation of a power vacuum into which but one other nation cold move, namely Soviet Russia.


 * ". If then we accept the objective of splitting Red China and the USSR, the statesman like approach would seem to be to bring Red China to a realization that its long-range benefits derive from friendliness with America, not with the USSR, which cast acquisitive eyes on its territory and resources; that these benefits could reasonably be expected, if Red China would mend its ways, abjure its offensively aggressive actions toward the West; and take steps to remove the stigma of "aggressor" with which it is now branded. The adoption of such a course of action and the employment of such measures dictate the necessity of the prompt strengthening of our military capabilities in order that American diplomacy may have that essential military support with which it cannot hope to succeed."

Rh