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 :the threat of further Chinese Communist expansion in Asia. It would provide the basis for action against indirect aggression which is lacking in both Alternatives A and B, while avoiding the more extreme measures, with their greatly enhanced risks, contained in Alternative D. Within the content of broader policies with respect to the worldwide threat of Soviet Communism, the steady and consistent application of the courses of action set forth in this alternative hold promise of achieving results advantageous to the security position of the Free World."

5. The comments of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on NSC 5429 follow:


 * "a. NSC 5429 addresses itself specifically to only the most fundamental aspects of the problem in the Far East, namely: the off-shore island chain; general political and economic measures in the Far East; negotiation of a Southeast Asia security treaty; action in the event of local subversion; policy with respect to Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia and Communist China. It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem.


 * "b. Moreover, the problem confronting us in the Far East cannot be stated, except in relation to and as an element in a United States foreign policy of global scope.


 * "c. While I do not suggest just what such global policy should be, it seems axiomatic to me that one principal OBJECTIVE therein should be to split Communist China from the Soviet Bloc. Quite aside from the great moral issue involved in the deliberate precipitation of general war the converse of this thesis is equally applicable. From the purely military point. of view we must not, by our own act, deliberately provoke war against the combined power of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, since to do so would be to choose a war against the most potentially powerful enemy coalition with a strong probability of losing the active support of some of our present Allies. This situation would have the most dangerous possible military consequences. We may well find ourselves in such a war, but it should NOT be our choice without having FIRST, taken every feasible step to increase our readiness to meet an explosion into general war, and SECOND, having mapped out and begun an approach to the OBJECTIVE stated above.

Rh