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 provinces adjoining the Communist-controlled areas of Northern Vietnam. Furthermore, the Geneva agreements give members of the "Pathet Lao" movement freedom of political action throughout Laos.

Cambodia

13. The internal Cambodian situation, except for sharp political rivalries among leading Cambodians, is at present relatively stable. Non-Communist dissidence appears to have abated and the principal dissident leader, Son Ngoc Thanh, no longer poses any real threat to the government. The King retains widespread popular support for having obtained a large degree of effective independence from the French and for having safeguarded Cambodia's integrity at Geneva. Although the Communists are permitted freedom of political action in Cambodia, they have only a minimum appeal. The Cambodian forces, although some what weakened by the withdrawal of French forces, have the capability of dealing with current Communist subversive action.

II. OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA

General Considerations

14. The Geneva agreements, although precise and detailed concerning the time and place of troop redeployments and related matters, are imprecise about matters pertaining to future military aid and training. Moreover, the agreements are vague with respect to political matters. Details on the implementation of national elections are left for the interested parties to determine. Except for such influence as may be exerted by the presence of supervisory teams from India, Canada, and Poland, there is no provision for forcing the parties concerned to implement or adhere to the agreements.

15. The course of future developments will be determined less by the Geneva agreements than by the relative capabilities and actions of the Conmlunist and non-Communist entitles in Indochina, and of interested outside powers.

16. Communist policy. Communist willingness to reach agreement for an armistice in Indochina, at a time when prolongation of the conflict could have produced a steadily deteriorating situation in Indochina, was probably derived in substantial part from the Communist estimate that: (a) an effort to win a total military victory in Indochina might precipitate US military intervention, and (b) the objective of gaining political control over all Indochina could be achieved as a result of the armistice agreement. The Communists also apparently believed that an attitude of "reasonableness" and the acceptance of an armistice in Indochina would contribute to the realization of their objective to undermine western efforts to develop an effective military coalition. They probably consider, therefore, that a deliberate resumption of large-scale military operations from their zone in the north would negate the political and psychological advantages the Communists have gained by negotiating a settlement and could involve grave risk of expanded war.

17. In the light of these considerations, we believe that the broad outlines of Communist policy in Indochina will be to: (a) refrain from deliberately taking major military action to break the armistice agreement while seeking to gain every advantage in the implementation of the agreements; (b) consolidate the Communist political, military, and economic position in North Vietnam; (c) conduct intensive political warfare against non-Communist Indochinese governments and people; (d) work for the ultimate removal of all Western influence, particularly French and US, from Indochina; and (e) emphasize and exploit issues in Indochina which will create and intensify divisions among non-Communist countries. In sum we believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological and paramilitary means.

18. French policy. It is impossible at this time to predict even the broad outlines of French policy in Indochina. The following appear to be the main alternatives: Rh