Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/341

Rh the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. The DRV probably still believes that it could emerge from free nationwide elections with control of all Vietnam. It will attempt to appear reasonable in any negotiations concerning procedures for elections. While the Communists almost certainly would not agree to complex and elaborate safeguards and guarantees, they probably would agree to some form of "neutral" (but not UN) supervision. They would probably estimate that such election controls would work to their advantage in the South and, as manipulated, would not adversely affect their position in the North. (Paras. 41–45)

6. In the meantime, the DRV will continue its efforts, through subversion, intimidation, and propaganda, to weaken the Diem government, and to bring to power in the South men prepared to accept a coalition with the DRV. (Para. 46)

7. The Communists in their propaganda have revealed sensitivity to the implication of the Mani1a Pact which incorporated Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in its area of protection. We believe that concern for Western, and particularly US reactions, together with general considerations arising from over-all Bloc policy, will prevent the DRV from openly invading the South during the period of this estimate. Similarly, the resumption of widespread guerrilla activities appears unlikely prior to the election deadline, unless the DRV should come to the conclusion that South Vietnam can be won only by force. Such a conclusion would become more likely should the Diem government persist in refusing to enter the election discussions, should election discussions not proceed favorably for the DRV, or should the Diem government succeed, with US assistance, in consolidating its strength to the point of becoming a nationalist alternative to the Ho regime. Moreover, if during the period CI this estimate little progress is made towards relaxing tensions, Peiping and Moscow might permit the DRV greater freedom of action. Should the DRV decide to use force short of open invasion, it would probably attempt to undermine the Saigon government by initiating a campaign of sabotage and terror, seeking to formation of a new government more amenable to demands for a national coalition. These tactics are likely to include the activation of DRV guerrilla units now in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by the infiltration in small units of regulars from the North. (Para. 47)

8. The DRV will probably refrain from launching an attack with its own forces to seize Laos during the period of this estimate. It will probably continue efforts to convince the Royal Laotian government of the propriety of the DRV attitude towards Laos, while covertly strengthening the rebel Pathet Lao movement. The DRV would probably infiltrate armed units into Laos to assist the Pathet Lao if Royal government military action should seriously threaten the

Rh