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To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam and to estimate probable future developments and trends to July 1956.

1. The immediate concern of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) is to consolidate its control in the area north of the 17th Parallel and to gain control of South Vietnam. (Para. 14)

2. We believe that the DRV will experience no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam during the period of this estimate and will probably retain a considerable measure of prestige and general acceptance. However, passive resistance and discontent resulting from harsh control measures and poor economic conditions may increase toward the end of the period. If the situation in the South does not deteriorate, the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam. (Para. 23)

3. The DEV is confronted by serious economic problems of which the current rice shortage is the most critical. Its present export potential falls far short of providing sufficient funds to pay for necessary imports. However, the Sino-Soviet Bloc will almost certainly provide sufficient economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for stability and control. With such assistance the DRV win probably make gradual progress in gaining control of the economy and in rehabilitating transportation, irrigation,- and industrial facilities. (Paras. 21–30)

4. Since the Geneva Conference, the strength of the DRV regular army has been increased substantially by drawing on regional forces to form new units and by the receipt of new and heavier military equipment from Communist China. DRV forces are capable of defeating all military forces, including the French, now located in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. (Paras. 31–35)

5. The present DRV tactic with respect to South Vietnam is to pose as the champion of Vietnamese independence and unification, and as the defender of Rh