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 their control and they may feel that their agreement to elections held under conditions which might be termed "free" would inevitably redound to their advantage. Furthermore, nationalist appeal in Viet-Nam is so closely identified with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh movement that, even in areas outside of Communist control, candidates and issues connected with "nationalism and supported by the Viet-Minh would probably be supported by the majority of the people. Thus, the Communists might be so confident of success that they would be willing to permit "free" elections under international supervision albeit continuing to utilize all the standard communist processes and tactics in an attempt to assure the outcome they would desire. Should they do so, there is no reason to doubt at this time that they would win easily in the 1956 elections.

In connection with the above, the issue of unification would be a popular one in Viet-Nam, despite the probable consequences of Communist domination. It would be dangerous to assume that South Viet-Nam would reject unification with the North. The South Vietnamese Government will not be operating in a propaganda vacuum in the South; Viet-Minh propaganda is still more intensive and successful then that of the Diem Government. Further, there is no guarantee that the people of the South will reject unification, particularly if the referendum is relatively free and supervised by an international commission. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the people of the north would approve unification under any circumstances which will provide them with the opportunity to take over the territory of the South, politically, economically and militarily.

Rh
 * It is questionable that South Viet-Nam could at this time win an election pertaining to thee unification cf Viet-Nam.