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 7. In the event or a split between the U.S. and French resulting in the withdrawal of a1l French political and military support to South Viet-Nam, the vacuum created by the withdrawal or the French Expeditionary Corp would have to be filled by other external forces pending the development of comparative strength in the Vietnamese Army. Without replacing the FEC by comparable forces, South Viet-Nam would be militarily impotent, end a demoralization of the Vietnamese Army and people could result.

In connection with the above, any thought of U.S. intervention under the SEACDT should be considered in the light of possible limitations of the Geneva Accords with respect to intervention by U.S. ground forces. A legalistic interpretation of the accords by the Viet-Minh and the ICC could consider such U.S. intervention as a major violation. The U.S., while not a signatory to the Geneva Accords, has publicly declared it would not contravene its provisions.

Assistance for intervention in South Viet-Nam probably cannot be expected from Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. or Pakistan. Thailand or the Philippines cannot provide sufficient troops to reinforce adequately the Vietnamese forces to the extent required. If, under these circumstances, Viet-Minh regular forces were to be committed against SEACDT forces, and no U.S. ground forces were employed, the Viet-Minh would be capable of defeating SEACDT forces subsequent to the withdrawal of the FEC. U.S. air and naval forces would hinder the Viet-Minh it is unlikely that they would significantly reduce the Viet-Minh capability to overrun Viet-Nam.

The paramilitary operations of the Viet-Minh in South Viet-Nam cannot be suppressed by those measures applicable in other countries, i.e. the Philippine suppression of the HUKS. The HUKS never had the degree of popular sympathy and support which the Viet-Minh currently enjoy. Rh