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 6. The accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam will depend largely upon the activities of the Viet-Minh. The Diem Government is not operating in a vacuum; it is effectively opposed by a strong, well-organized and efficient Communist political organization south of the 17th parallel, supported locally by a covert paramilitary organization capable of wide-scale guerrilla action, and overtly above the 17th parallel by a numerically larger, relatively better equipped regular army of 250,000 troops. The Viet-Minh can be expected to oppose efforts by the Diem Government to pacify and gain control over all territory south of the 17th parallel, particularly when and if such efforts pose a significant threat to the Viet-Minh activities in that area. Such opposition could take the form of: (a) psychological warfare and subversive penetration; (b) sabotage and local terrorist actions; (c) initiation of wide-scale guerrilla operations; (d) reinforcement of this guerrilla action by infiltration of limited numbers of regular troops from the north; and finally (e) overt full-scale invasion of South Viet-Nam. The Vietnamese Government currently is incapable alone of successfully countering any of these courses of action. Optimistically, if the current U.S. program should be successful in all fields, the Diem Government probably could counter course (a), and possibly could keep course (b) under control. The force level programmed for the Vietnamese Army would preclude countering successfully courses (c), (d), and (e).

The Viet-Minh are capable, in the absence of a strong popularly supported government in South Viet-Nam, even without resorting to overt aggression, of preventing the total accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam. Rh