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 and tends to portray him as being indispensable, which should not be the case. Should Diem fall, U.S. programs might conceivable be continued under a successor government, particularly if a more dynamic, capable leader (albeit with less initial pprestigeprestige [sic]) were placed in control. Former Foreign Minister Bo or Dr. Quat, as recommended by General Collins, should be given adequate consideration.

The alternative of withdrawing U.S. support should not be stated as a clear-cut negative course of action. If the Diem experiment fails, and the U.S. does not consider support to South Viet-Nam as being warranted, there is a wide scale of courses of action which would be adopted by the United States to minimize the effects of a Communist take over in South Viet-Nam. These include: (a) support of French efforts to create a South Vietnamese Government which would work out a settlement with the Viet-Minh; (b) clandestine operations to hinder the consolidation of Communist control; (c) augmentation of programs to develop anti-Communist positions of strength in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand; and (d) other political, economic and psychological measures designed to gain the sympathy of, and to develop support from the "neutral" nations of Southeast Asia. These measures might include continuation of U.S. "humanitarian" programs of economic and social assistance in South Viet-Nam pending the assumption of complete control of this area by a Communist government.


 * Alternatives to the Diem Government should be given adequate consideration in the event the U.S. cannot longer reasonably support Diem.

5. The problem of the Sects has been commented on in recent correspondence from the field and in analyzing the courses of action available in Rh