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 (d) French desire to avoid a resumption of hostilities at all cost, since past developments have led them to believe that their ground forces ould lear te brunt of renewed fighting.

(e) Because or their dependence on U.S. financial support to maintain their presence in Indochina, they are inclined to go along with the U.S. policy in South Viet-Nam as one means of maintaining some influence in the ares, although certain groups (colonialists) are actively undermining the U.S. program locally in South Viet-Nam.

(f) The French doubt that the U.S. program will succeed, and as added insurance endeavoring to establish an understanding the Viet-Minh which be expanded to include a political settlement for all of Viet-Nam in the event that U.S. programs fail, thus retaining some degree of influence.

(g) They are becoming apprehensive lest U.S. policy should completely fail, and lost their attempts to gain a settlement with the Viet-Minh will also fail and are thus beginning to contemplate the possible necessity of a complete withdrawal from Viet-Nam before the elections are held.

(h) They would be willing to stay as long as U.S. financial support continue and the U.S. gives then a major voice in determining policy.

(i) Their primary motivations are (a) financial, and (b) prestige. They are reluctant to withdraw from Indochina because would then weaken their position as a "world power", as a member of the "Big Four" or "Big Five", and would lose what prestige they hold as a "Far Eastern" power. Rh